DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS BONN

BONN ECON NEWS

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Overview

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Workshops and seminars

Tuesday, May 13, 2025

ReStart Talk (ECONtribute)

Regina Riphahn (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg)	"Geringfügige Beschäftigung und der Arbeitsmarkterfolg junger Mütter"
Time 12:00–13:00 CET Online Zoom link will be sent after registration. Click here to register. For more details please see the program	Abstract Im Jahr 2024 betrug der Gender Pay Gap in Deutschland 16 %. Ein Großteil der Ungleichheit zwischen Männern und Frauen am Arbeitsmarkt entsteht mit der Geburt von Kindern, nach der Mütter häufiger und länger ihre Erwerbstätigkeit pausieren. Sind Minijobs in diesem Kontext ein Sprungbrett für die Karriere, weil sie es jungen Müttern erlauben, früh nach der Geburt des Kindes den Anschluss an den Arbeitsmarkt nicht zu verlieren? Oder sind sie eher eine Sackgasse, die junge Mütter in weniger qualifizierte Beschäftigung mit geringeren Aufstiegschancen lockt?

Bonn Applied Microeconomics Seminar (CRC TR 224 Seminar)

Marta Serra Garcia (UC San Diego)	"The Attention–Information Trade-Off"
Time 14:15–15:45 CET Location IZA, Conference Room, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9	Abstract How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals' incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers to the content created. Attention incentives lead to significantly less information being transmitted, but not more factually inaccurate content. These incentives increase information demand and the knowledge of interested receivers. However, among the majority of receivers who do not demand more information, attention incentives lower knowledge and increase biases in beliefs, revealing that missing information can be a channel through which misperceptions arise.

Wednesday, May 14, 2025

BGSE Micro Workshop

Jonas von Wangenheim (University of Bonn)	"Organizational Change and Reference-Dependent Preferences"
Time 12:00–13:00 CET Location Juridicum, Reinhard Selten Room (0.017)	Abstract TBA

MEF/ECONtribute Seminar (Macro/Econometrics)

Cristiano Cantore (Sapienza University of Rome)	"A tail of labor supply and a tale of monetary policy"
Coauthors Filippo Ferroni, Haroon Mumtaz, Angeliki Theophilopoulou Time 12:15–13:30 CET Location Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)	Abstract We study the interaction between monetary policy and labor supply decisions at the household level. We uncover evidence of heterogeneous responses and a strong countercyclicality of hours worked in the left tail of the income distribution following a monetary policy shock in the U.S. Specifically, while aggregate hours and labor earnings decline after a monetary tightening, individuals at the bottom of the income distribution increase their hours worked. Moreover, this positive labor supply response is quantitatively significant, substantially dampening the decline in aggregate hours worked. We show that the empirical patterns are consistent with a standard one-asset HANK model featuring endogenous labor supply. The model reveals that strong income effects at the bottom of the distribution can account for the observed countercyclical labor responses, highlighting how labor supply adjustments act as an additional margin through which households smooth consumption. Comparing this specification to a model with a homogeneous labor supply, we find that labor supply heterogeneity reduces the aggregate MPC and further shifts the transmission of monetary policy away from intertemporal substitution toward direct income effects.

Micro Theory Seminar

Krishna Dasaratha (Boston University)	"Incentive Design with Spillovers"
Coauthors Benjamin Golub, Anant Shah Time 16:30–17:45 CET Location Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)	Abstract A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging methods from network games. The main results characterize the optimal allocation of incentive pay across agents and outcomes. Incentive optimality requires equalizing, across agents, a product of (i) individual productivity (ii) organizational centrality and (iii) responsiveness to monetary incentives.

Thursday, May 15, 2025

Econometrics & Statistics Seminar

Patrik Guggenberger (Penn State University)	"On the numerical approximation of minimax regret rules via fictitious play"
Coauthor Jiaqi Huang Time 16:00–17:00 CET Location Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)	Abstract Given the lack of analytical solutions for minimax regret treatment rules in most scenarios of empirical interest, finding numerical approximations is of key interest. To do so, in this paper, we suggest discretizing the action space of nature and then using an algorithm based on Robinson's (1951) pioneering work on iterative solutions for two-person zero-sum games with finite action space. This approach is known in the game theory literature as fictitious play and can be shown to converge to a minimax rule, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1998). As a key application we consider a policymaker who has to choose between two treatments after observing a dataset with potentially unequal sample sizes per treatment. To dramatically increase computation time we leverage the general algorithm with theoretical insights about certain symmetry conditions that can be imposed on the treatment rules. Other applications are considered, e.g. testing a status quote treatment against several innovations.